We extend the Barro (1990) model of endogenous growth to a two-sector one which consists of pure consumption and investment goods. It is possible that the extended version has a unique balanced growth rate such that for given initial values of state variables, (i) the extended model economy grows at the unique rate right from the beginning or (ii) it has a continuum of equilibrium paths whose growth rates commonly converge to the balanced growth rate. That is, unlike the original one-sector model, it has transitional dynamics in case (ii). We also show that the effects of small changes in some parameters on the balanced growth rate and the price of the consumption good in terms of the investment good are opposite between (i) and (ii).
Introduction
Indeterminacy is one of the recent topics that have been paid much attention in macroeconomic theory 1 . However, while there have appeared many papers which explore this topic in the framework of exogenous growth models, the literature on the topic in the context of multisector endogenous growth is limited only to the models in which human capital is the * We thank Koichi Futagami, Tatsuro Iwaisako, Kazuo Mino and the seminar participants at the universities of Kobe and Osaka for their valuable comments. † Corresponding author: RIEB, Kobe University, Rokkodai-cho, Nada-ku, Kobe, 657-8501, Japan. However, the main purpose of this paper is not to derive indeterminacy in an endogenous growth model, but to make clear the implication of indeterminacy for the dependence of the balanced growth path on some parameters.
In static equilibrium models, Walrasian or Marshallian stability conditions provide useful information concerning comparative statical analysis. Likewise, the conditions for saddlepoint stability are useful for examining the effects of changes in parameters on the steady state in dynamic equilibrium models. However, it is well known that saddlepoint stability is not the unique stability concept in dynamic equilibrium models. It is possible that the characteristic equations of some of the latter models have their roots such that the number of the roots with the negative real parts, say n, is larger than the number of the state values, say m. In that case it is possible that there is a continuum of equilibrium paths starting form the same initial condition and converging to a common steady state. Thus, while there is no mechanism that determines which equilibrium path is realized, the steady state itself is stable, which implies that we can study the effects of parameter changes on the long-run equilibrium for dynamic equilibrium models in which indeterminacy takes place.
Moreover, the effects can be opposite between the cases of saddlepoint stability (n = m) and indeterminacy (n > m). To illustrate, consider a simplest possible dynamic equilibrium model which consists of one state variable, say x, and one jump variable, say y :
where a is a parameter. Assuming that the steady state (x(a),ȳ(a)) uniquely exists for any given a, and totally differentiating
with respect tox(a),ȳ(a) and a, we have
where 
We see that (4) means that the effects of a small change in parameter a on the steady-state values depend on the sign of the determinant of the coefficient matrix in (3) . Since the characteristic equation is formulated as
it is clear that while the determinant is negative if the steady state is saddlepoint-stable, it should be positive if indeterminacy takes place. Therefore, the effects of a small change in parameter a on the steady state are completely opposite between saddlepoint stability and indeterminacy.
The foregoing argument sheds light on an aspect of indeterminacy that is left unexplored.
One may then ask whether the aforementioned opposite long-run effects can be derived in a standard endogenous growth model. Our answer is "yes": The main purpose of the rest of this paper is to show that the opposite long-run effects are possible in a two-sector model of endogenous growth which is a straightforward extension of Barro (1990) .
As a by-product, there is another implication of indeterminacy for the Barro model. 
The Model
We consider a closed economy with competitive markets which consists of households, firms and the government. Following Barro (1990) , we assume that the government imposes income tax on households and use the tax revenues to provide nontrivial and nonexcludable public services to enhance private labor efficiency. Taking the public services as given, firms produces two goods, pure consumption and investment goods, by using capital and labor as inputs.
Firms
, and L i (t) be public services flow, capital and labor inputs to the production of good i, respectively. The production function of good i is denoted as
Here i = 1 (resp. 2) corresponds to the consumption (resp. investment) good. Public services G enter the production functions as a labor-augmenting factor. It is this laboraugmenting effect that makes possible permanent growth. η is a positive parameter.
Denote the aggregate capital stock and labor supply by K andL. The aggregate labor supply is assumed to be constant over time. We setL = 1 for simplicity thereafter. Thus full employment conditions are
Let r and w represent the rental rate and the wage rate respectively. Then, v ≡ w/G can be interpreted as the wage rate paid for employing an efficiency unit of labor. Similarly, let us denote r/η by R. Due to constant returns to scale concerning private factors of production, we see that competitive markets and profit maximization lead to
where φ i (R, v) represents the unit cost function of good i and p is the price of consumption good in terms of the investment good, which serves as the numeraire in this paper.
We make the following assumptions concerning the unit cost functions.
ASSUMPTION 1 (COST FUNCTIONS): (i) Each unit cost function is increasing
and strictly concave in each variable: For any positive r and v,
. (ii) Each unit cost function is linearly homogeneous and quasiconcave in R and v. (iii) The Inada conditions hold:
REMARK 1: Assumption 1 implies that for any (R, v) > (0, 0) and for i = 1, 2,
For the proof, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (Chapter 1, 1995). 
ASSUMPTION 2 (FACTOR-INTENSITY RANKING): For any p > 0, (5a) and (5b) uniquely determine a positive pair (R(p), v(p)). The consumption good (good 1) is more labor-intensive than the investment good (good 2) in the sense that for any
Recall that φ i R /ηφ i v is the capital/(efficiency ) labor ratio in sector i. The factor-intensity ranking (6) seems to be plausible. An example satisfying ASSUMPTIONS 1 and 2 is Cobb-
Note that the rental rate is r(p; η) 
The government and market-clearing condition
Following Barro (1990) , we assume that the government finances its spending through a proportional tax at a constant rate τ imposed on the aggregate national income. Then the budget constraint of the government is
, from which we obtain the government-spending/capital ratio
It is well known in trade theory 5 that, as far as the two goods are both produced, the partial derivative of the national income v(p)G + ηR(p)K with respect to the price of the consumption good is positive and equal to the supply of the consumption good. Therefore, we obtain the market-clearing condition
4 Let us prove lim However, this possibility contradicts Remark 1 again, since it and Remark 1 together would imply
We can prove lim where C is the demand for the consumption good 6 . Combining (8) and (9), we have the consumption/capital ratio
Households
Each infinitely lived household owns one unit of labor and capital K, and earns income by supplying them to firms as production inputs. Each household spends the after-tax income in consumption goods purchasing, pC, and capital stock investing,K. The flow budget constraint she is facing is
Under this constraint, she seeks to maximize the life-time utility
is the inverse of the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and ρ > 0 is the rate of time preference.
Associated with the current value Hamiltonian
we obtain the first-order conditions for optimality
and the transversality condition (TVC)
The two-sector endogenous growth model
Based on the foregoing argument, we now present the two-sector model. Letting Y ≡ p 1/σ C and considering (11a) and (11b), we can derive the Keynes-Ramsey rule,
Furthermore, combining the two budget constraints (8) and (11c), we obtaiṅ
6 Equation (9) means that the government purchases the investment good by the tax revenue and transforms it to the public services.
Finally, substituting Y into the market-clearing condition (10), we get
Let x ≡ Y /K, combining (13) and (14), and considering (15), we derive a two-sector version of the Barro model of endogenous growth as follows:
where
3 The condition to be satisfied along a balanced growth path Let us make some preparations for deriving our main result. A balanced growth path of the above system (16) and (17) is defined as an equilibrium path such that p and x are constants over time, therefore K, C grow with a positive rate at BGP. In order for a pair (p e , x e ) to be a balanced growth path for a given tax rate τ ∈ (0, 1), the following conditions for balanced growth and equilibrium have to be satisfied.
Considering (16), we see that unless (C1) were satisfied, x and p could not remain to be constant over time. (C2) is necessary for G/K to be positive. As is clear from (13), the balanced growth rate is not positive unless (C3) is satisfied. (C4) is the transversality condition (12).
Considering the properties of R(p) and v (p) in (7), we see that there exist p 2 , p 3 , and p 4 respectively such that
• (1 − τ )ηR(p) − ρ 0, according as p p 3 .
• 
Thus, the first inequality in (C5), −(1 − τ ) < Θ(p e ), means that the consumption good is produced along a balanced growth path. Next, from (14) and (15),
Thus, under (C2), the second inequality in (C5), Θ(p e ) < 0, means that the investment good is also produced. Using a term in trade theory, the two inequalities ensures us that production in the economy is incompletely specialized.
LEMMA 1: Under (C2) and (C5), Θ(p) is increasing in p.
Proof: Differentiating Θ(p) with respect to p, we have dΘ(p) dp
Note that if production is incompletely specialized, the second term is the slope of the supply curve of the consumption good, which is known to be positive in trade theory 7 . Since (C2) means that the first term is also positive, the slope of Θ(p) is positive, as was to be proved. 
Note that by definition the function Θ(p) is continuous in
Finally, in order to discuss about indeterminacy, the dynamic system (16) and (17) have to satisfy causality (Burmeister and Dobell (Chapter 4, 1970) ).
LEMMA 2: Under (C2) and (C5), Λ(p) in (17) is increasing in p.
Proof: This can be seen easily from the following: dΛ dp
and along with the same reasoning as in proving Lemma 1.
The last lemma guarantees that for a given x(t),ẋ(t) is uniquely determined by (16) and (17), i.e., causality is guaranteed.
4 The indeterminacy result
We shall diagrammatically obtain the main result in this paper.
First, choose the value of η, say η 0 , so that the following equality holds.
( Moreover, as long as σ is small, the slope of σΘ(p) is smaller than that of Φ(p; η 0 − ∆η)
at p e . Since Lemma 2 ensures us that Λ p (p e ) > 0, considering (17) and differentiating (16) with respect to x at p e , we have
which means that the dynamic system, (16) and (17), is locally stable. We obtain the following proposition. Making a parallel argument but assuming that σ is sufficiently large, we obtain Figure   2 . Increasing the value of η slightly, fromη 0 toη 0 + ∆η, we have the balanced growth path E . However, this time the slope of σΘ(p) is larger than that of Φ(p;η 0 + ∆η), which means that the dynamic system, (16) and (17), is locally unstable. Since p is a jump variable, it follows that the balanced growth path is the only equilibrium path. 
Note that these signs hold whether the BGP is indeterminate or not.
Therefore, the effects of small changes in the three parameters are determined once the sign of the denominator in (20) is made clear. As we have already shown in the previous section, the sign of the denominator is opposite between a determinate and indeterminate BGP. Thus, we now arrive at the results shown in Table 1 . Now let us turn to another important endogenous variable, the balanced growth path, g e . From (13)
Taking partial differentiation with respect to η, ρ and σ, yields
The results in Table 1 and Assumpation 2 imply that, when the BGP is indeterminate, the signs of (21)- (23) are ∂g e ∂η > 0, ∂g e ∂ρ < 0, ∂g e ∂σ < 0.
Next let us examine the effects of changes in η, ρ and σ on g e in the case of determinate BGP. Define a pair (η,p) as satisfying Φ(p, η) = 0 and Θ(p) = 0 simultanously for any given ρ > 0 and τ ∈ (0, 1). For such pair, defineσ as
Then for a σ larger but sufficiently close toσ, and from the construction of BGP in Section 4, we see that this σ together with some η, which is larger but sufficiently close toη, corresponds to a determinate BGP, p e . That is
Note that, (24) is close to zero because σ is close toσ. Based on the foregoing results, we can derive the signs of (21)-(23) as follows.
First, combining (20) and (21), we have
Since the first term in the square bracket is close to zero, it is dominated by the second one.
Hence ∂g e /∂η < 0. Making a parallel argument, we obtain ∂g e /∂ρ > 0.
Finally, inspecting (23) we see that ∂g e /∂σ is positive for a pair (σ, η) which is larger but sufficiently close to (σ,η). The comparative statics of p e and g e with respect to τ 's change is generally ambiguous. Since the polar
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to illustrate an indeterminate balanced growth path in a two-sector version of the Barro-type endogenous growth model under the factor-intensity ranking such that the investment good is more capital-intensive than the consumption good.
The opposite long-run effects of a small change in each parameter between determinate and indeterminate equilibria indicate a theoretical possibility that indeterminacy provides a new dimension for the correspondence principle and, therefore, makes it possible for applied dynamic equilibrium theorists to pursue comparative statical results that cannot be derived under saddlepoint stability. For example, dynamic trade theorists may want to explore whether the effects of parametric changes in preferences, technologies, factor endowments and commercial policies in trading countries on long-run trade and production structures in each country can be different between determinate and indeterminate equilibrium cases. 
